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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The Evidence Was Not Admissible Under Both l.R.E. 403 And 404(b). 
In the Opening Brief, Appellant, Mr. Mallory ("Gary"), argued that the District Court 
abused its discretion in admitting the evidence of the old rib fractures. While the state says 
otherwise, its arguments in response are unpersuasive. 
First, the state argues that "the plain language of I.R.E. 404(b )" forecloses Gary's 
argument. Brief of Respondent ("State's Brief'), pg. 6. Its theory is that since "there was no 
evidence presented that Mallory caused the injuries" the evidence cannot be evidence of a crime, 
wrong, or act committed by Gary. Id. But that is why the evidence is inadmissible. While there 
was no proof that Gary inflicted the old injuries, the state sought to introduce the evidence so that 
the jury would assume that he did so, and making it, in the jurors' minds, more likely that he 
inflicted the recent injuries. Excepting that improper purpose, there is no purpose for the state to 
introduce the evidence. Thus, the state's accusation that Gary "ignores this point," misses the 
true point. Prior bad acts evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude the act 
occurred and the defendant was the actor. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52,205 P.3d 1185, 1188 
(2009). The state sought to present evidence to plant in the minds of the jurors that Mr. Mallory 
committed a previous crime even though the logical force of its evidence couldn't make that 
case. Thus, the evidence is not admissible under Grist because the jury could not reasonably 
conclude that Gary inflicted the old rib injuries. But now, curiously, the state argues that the 
evidence was admissible because it didn't prove what the state presented the evidence to prove. 
That argument should be rejected by this Court. 
The state's argument, moreover, is easily met by Mr. Mallory's previous argument that 
the court abused its discretion when it admitted the evidence under I.R.E. 403. That is: the Court 
erred by concluding that the evidence was not unduly prejudicial because it did not realize that 
the evidence had no probative value other than the improper inference that Gary had a violent 
criminal character and was likely to have acted in conformity therewith on February 14, 2009. It 
is important to recall that the doctor noted that the fractures were caused by blunt force trauma. 
T Vol. II, pg. 793, In. 6-10. And, in the absence of any suggestion that Charlene Mallory 
("Charlene") could have received the old injuries from some accidental cause, the likely 
conclusion drawn from the evidence was that Charlene's husband, Gary, brutalized her. As 
previously argued, that is simply evidence of another crime to show a trait of Gary's character, 
i.e., criminal brutality, to prove he acted in conformity therewith. Thus, while the state makes a 
good point when it argues that the evidence did not logically connect Gary to the old injuries, the 
point it proves is that the court erred when it failed to properly balance the probative value of the 
evidence (none) against the danger of unfair prejudice (great). Grist, 147 Idaho at 
1188. 
205 P.3d at 
The state's point is especially strong because both I.R.E. 403 and 404(b), the bases for 
Gary's objection below, require that balancing to be properly done. Thus, even ifl.R.E. 404(b) 
were not implicated, the evidence still must be relevant to be admissible. See State v. Sheldon, 
145 Idaho 225, 228, 178 P.3d 28, 31 (2008) (Where the Court turns to relevancy determination 
after finding possession of a large amount of cash is not a crime, wrong or other act under 
404(b).). Therefore, the state's argument that "I.R.E. 404(b) was not implicated by the evidence 
that Charlene had old rib fractures," even if true, does not resolve the case because I.R.E. 402 and 
403 were undoubtedly implicated. Because there was no probative value to the evidence, it was 
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inadmissible because: 1) it was not relevant, and 2) its prejudicial effect outweighed the 
nonexistent probative value. 
The state, however, argues that the evidence "was relevant in that it provided the basis for 
[Dr. Aiken's] opinion on Charlene's cause of death and injuries she suffered near the time of 
death[.]" State's Brief, pg. 8. To the contrary, Dr. Aiken's testimony about the old rib injuries 
had nothing to do with either the cause of death (manual strangulation) or the other recent 
injuries. Even the trial court admitted that the older injuries "d[id] not appear to have been a 
contributing factor in the cause of death." T Vol. I, pg. 88, ln. 5-1 O; see also T Vol. II, pg. 792. 
ln. 19 - pg. 793, ln. 5 (where the doctor testifies that the new rib fractures could not have been the 
cause of death). Nor did it, as the state argues, provide "foundation for the entirety of the 
autopsy" or allow Dr. Aiken "to distinguish between the old and new fractures that formed the 
basis of the domestic battery charge." State's Brief, pg. 8. The old injuries in no way provided 
foundation for the new injuries. According to Professor Lewis, opinions by expert witnesses 
only require a foundation showing adequate expertise to render the opinions potentially helpful to 
the trier of fact. Idaho Trial Handbook§ 14:6 (2d ed.). There was no dispute over whether the 
doctor possessed the requisite expertise to render an opinion and her opinion about the new 
injuries was not dependent upon the existence of the old injuries. In short, the state has not 
identified any proper purpose for the doctor to testify about the old injuries or distinguish 
between the old and new. 
It is no answer to the problem of the inadmissible evidence to as the state does, that 
the 'Jury was instructed ... that its finding of guilt must be based 'only on the evidence admitted 
in this trial.'" State's Brief, pgs 8-9. The improper evidence was admitted and, by this 
,.., 
.) 
instruction, the jury was permitted to consider it and all the inferences which could be drawn 
from it. The quoted instruction on to say "[t]his evidence consisted of the testimony oft he 
vvitnesses, the exhibited offered and received, and any stipulated or admitted facts." R 227 
(emphasis added). 
That same instruction goes on to tell the jury: 
There is no magical formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You bring 
with you to this courtroom all the experience and background of your lives. In 
your everyday affairs you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you 
believe, and how much weight you attach to what you are told. The same 
considerations that you use in your everyday dealings in making these decisions 
are the considerations that you should apply in your deliberations. 
R 278. Yet, the court's exhortation to the jury to use its collective commonsense in evaluating 
the testimony is another reason why it is important to limit the evidence before the jury to what is 
admissible under the rules of evidence. All of us, in our everyday affairs, give weight to 
evidence based upon inferences drawn upon it even when, under strict rules of logic, the 
evidence does not warrant such an inference. For example, some people believe that the stock 
market will go up if a team from the fonner National Football League wins the Super Bowl 
because there has been a correlation between such teams winning and the Standard and Poor's 
500 gaining value in that year. See, Wall Street Wants The Patriots To Lose Super Bowl-Here's 
Whv, http://www.cnbc.com/id/46252439. This type of "causalation" is a logical fallacy. 
Correlation does not prove causation. The same is true here, the existence of the old injuries 
does not logically link Gary to the new injuries, yet jurors in their everyday affairs often draw 
connections between unrelated events. Thus, the court's instruction did not cure the error in the 
admission of the old injury evidence. It exacerbated the error. 
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Finally, the state argues that the prejudicial effect of the evidence did not rise to the level 
of "unfair prejudice, which has been defined as evidence that inflames the jury and rouses them 
to overmasking hostility." State's Brief, pg. 9 (internal quotation marks omitted) quoting State v. 
Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 88, 785 P.2d 647, 652 (Ct. App. 1989) in turn quoting E. CLEARY, 
McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190 (3d ed. 1984). However, Gauna does not define "unfair 
prejudice" in that matter. 1 Further, "[w]hen the sole purpose of the other-crimes evidence is to 
show some propensity to commit the crime at trial, there is no room for ad hoc balancing. The 
evidence is then unequivocally inadmissible - this is the meaning of the rule against other crimes 
evidence." 1 McCormick On Evid. § 190 (6th ed.). Finally, when balancing the probative value 
against the unfair prejudice, there is nothing on the probative value side of the scale and it is 
outweighed by the prejudicial effect by necessity. 
B. The State Has Not Met Its Burden Of Proving The Error Was Harmless Beyond A 
Reasonable Doubt. 
The state has not met its burden of proving the error was harmless. It does not deny that 
its case was purely circumstantial. It does not deny there were no witnesses to the killing. It 
1 The full quote from McCormick's is set forth in the opinion: 
In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice and the like substantially 
outweighs the incremental probative value, a variety of matters must be 
considered, including the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the 
other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the interval of time that has 
elapsed between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative 
proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility. 
State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho at 87-88, 785 P.2d at 651-52 (emphasis added). Even though the 
Court goes on to misapply the test under the particular facts of the case, it does not define unfair 
prejudice as "evidence that 'inflames the jury' and rouses them to 'overmasking hostility,"' as 
argued by the state. Rather the Gauna Court appears to endorse the treatise's position. 
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does not deny there were no signs of a struggle or that no one heard any unusual noises corning 
from Gary and Charlene's bedroom. And it does not deny there was no forensic evidence linking 
Gary to the murder, no confession by him, or even a motive for him to kill his wife. In light of 
the above, the e1Tor cannot be deemed to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Gary Mallory respectfully asks that this Court reverse the District Court's Judgment of 
Conviction for Murder and Felony Domestic Battery and remand the ease for a new trial. 
c( 
Respectfully submitted thi~ day of February, 2012. 
~~-=-Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Gary Mallory 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thi;:s~ay of February, 201 I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing to be mailed to: Jessica Lorello, Deputy Attorney General, 
Criminal Law Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0010. 
Uub'dS~~ 
Dennis Benjamin 
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